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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
INSURANCE LAW-MVAIC-UNnNsURFD DRIVERs ENDORSEMENT CALL-
ING FOR REDUCTION OF WORMIEN'S COMPENSATION PAYMENTS FRoMt "IN-
SURED" CLAIMANT'S AWARD Is NOT CONTRARY TO LEGISLATIVE INTENT
Petitioner, while a passenger on his employer's motor scooter, was involved
in an accident with an uninsured automobile. As a result of the accident
petitioner received a workmen's compensation award of $6,710.95. Petitioner
was covered by the uninsured drivers endorsement contained in his employer's
vehicle liability insurance policy and hence was an "insured" under Motor
Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation1 (MVAIC) Law. Under MVAIC
Law an "insured" claimant is limited in his recovery to 10,000 dollars which
according to a clause in the endorsement, drafted by the insurance carriers and
approved by the Superintendent of Insurance, shall be reduced by any work-
men's compensation payments because of the same accident. 2 "Insured," unable
to agree with the corporation as to the amount due him, filed for arbitration of
his claim as prescribed by MVAIC law. The arbitrator found "insured's" damages
to exceed 18,000 dollars and awarded the maximum 10,000 dollars. The arbitra-
tor refused to reduce the award by the workmen's compensation benefits received
by the "insured" claimant. "Insured" moved in Supreme Court to confirm the
award and have judgment rendered upon it. MVAIC opposed the motion and
moved under the New York Civil Practice Act section 1462-a,a then in effect,
to reduce the award by the amount of workmen's compensation received by
"insured." Special Term held the arbitrator had exceeded his powers and granted
MVAIC's motion to modify the award. The Appellate Division reinstated the
arbitrator's full award.4 MVAIC appealed to the Court of Appeals which re-
versed the order of the Appellate Division. Held: the rider attached to the
MVAIC endorsement calling for the deduction of workmen's compensation from
any award made by MVAIC to an "insured" claimant was valid and not contrary
to legislative intent, two judges dissenting. Matter of Durant (MVAIC), 15
N.Y.2d 408, 207 N.E.2d 600, 260 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1965).
By the early 1920s the automobile was no longer a novelty and was
rapidly becoming a part of the American way of life. The price of this con-
1. N.Y. Ins. Law § 602 creates a nonprofit corporation known as "MVAIC" to which
every insurer authorized to write vehicle liability insurance within the state is required to
belong. Members of the corporation are assessed for operation expenses (N.Y. Ins. Law
§ 607). The corporation investigates claims of injured victims of uninsured and hit and run
vehicles and renders awards to "insured" claimants (N.Y. Ins. Law § 605(a) (3)) or to
"qualified" claimants, those not covered by an insurance policy (N.Y. Ins. Law § 605(c)),
where the accident occurred within the state.
2. The liability endorsement required by the N.Y. Ins. Law § 167(2-a) to be drafted
by the insurance industry and approved by the Superintendent of Insurance provides in
part in the standard liability insurance policy in New York State: "5. Limits of Liability
(b) Any amount payable under the terms of this endorsement, . . . shall be reduced
by... (3) the amount paid and the present value of all amounts payable on account of such
bodily injury under any workmen's compensation law ... "
3. N.Y. CPLR § 7511(c).
4. Durant v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indemnification Corp., 20 A.D.2d 242, 246 N.Y.S.2d
548 (2d Dep't 1964).
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venience was high. Between 1921 and 1930 alone 239,353 persons were killed
in motor vehicle accidents. 5 Yet, with close to twenty-seven million cars re-
gistered in 1929, liability insurance covered only twenty-seven percent of all
private and commercial vehicles in America. 6 The need to protect innocent
victims of uninsured negligent motorists was reflected in early state legislation
calling for either compulsory insurance7 or proof of financial responsibility. 8
Since then every state9 and many foreign countries'0 have adopted either com-
pulsory insurance or proof of financial responsibility statutes. There remained,
however, in New York, a large group of innocent victims of financially irre-
sponsible uninsured drivers or hit and run drivers who had no recourse for
their injuries. With the interest of these victims in mind and because of their
dislike for state imposed compulsory insurance laws" and public unsatisfied
judgment funds12 the liability insurance carriers first proposed uninsured
motorist coverage. Plans requiring all motor vehicle liability policies issued
within the state to contain an uninsured motorist endorsement were brought
into effect in many states.' 3 Similar acts proposed in New York, on two separate
occasions, failed to become law' 4 despite the support of the governor. 15 Instead
in 1957 the New York legislature passed the Compulsory Insurance Act.' 6 It
was not until 195817 that New York passed legislation to plug the gaps still
remaining in its vehicle insurance protection and created MVAIC, a nonprofit
corporation. The purpose of MVAIC was to secure for innocent victims of
motor vehicle accidents recompense for injury and financial loss flowing from
accidents caused by uninsured motor vehicles from foreign states' hit and run
vehicles, stolen vehicles, insured motor vehicles where the insured disclaims
liability' 8 and unregistered motor vehicles. 19 The ultimate goal of the legislature
S. See Ward, New York's Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation: Past,
Present and Future, 8 Buffalo L. Rev. 215, 217, n.3 (1958).
6. Id. at 217 nA.
7. E.g., Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 90, § 34A-J; ch. 175 § 113A-G (1946).
8. E.g., Conn. Pub. Act ch. 183 (1925).
9. See Ward, supra note 5, at 218, n.8 for a complete alphabetical list of citations to
state statutes to which add Alaska Com. Laws Ann. ch. 8, §§ 50-8-1 through 50-8-65
(Cum. Sunp. 1959).
10. See Ward, "The Uninsured Motorist: National and International Prntection
Presently Available and Comparative Problems in Substantial Similarity." 9 Buffalo L. Rev.
283, 296-306 (1959) for problems in Canadian Provinces, England, France, Switzerland,
Australia, Tapan and New Zealand.
11. E.g., Massachusetts (Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 90, § 113A-G (1946)); New York
(N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law ". 93-93K (now §. 310-21)).
12. E.g., North Dakota (N.D. Cent. Code §§ 39-1701-10 (Sunn. 1957)): New Jersev
(N.T. Rev. Stat. § 3A: 6-61-91 (Supp. 1958)); and Maryland (Md. Ann. Code art. 6632,
§§ 150-79 (1957)).
13. E.g., N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 268:15 (1957); Va. Code Ann. §§ 38.1-381 (SupD.
1964); Cal. Ins. Code § 11580.2 (Deering 1963) (Unique in that insurer and insured mtoy
contract to waive coverage from uninsured. See Cal. Ins. Code § 11580.2(a) (Deering 1963)).
14. N.Y. State Leg. Doc. (1957) no. 1; and N.Y. State Leg. Doc. (1958) no. 6.
15. N.Y. State Leg. Doc. (1957) no. 36.
16. N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 93-93K (now § 310-21).
17. N.Y. Ins. Law §§ 167(2-a), 183(1)(f), 600-26; N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law
§§ 93(f), 93(h)(11). (12) (now §§ 316, 3-18).
18. Matter of Kaiser, 35 Misc. 2d 636, 231 N.Y.S.2d 178 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (MVAIC
coverage existed where driver was insured but insurer denied coverage); but see, Uline v.
737
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was to afford to the injured victim the same protection as he would have had
if he were hit by a tortfeasor covered by the minimum statutory liability policy
of 10,000 dollars for injury or death to one person and 20,000 dollars for injury
or death to all persons involved in a single accident.20 The statute was held
constitutional. 2'
Unlike any other jurisdiction, New York invoked two separate procedures
for two distinct classes of MVAIC claimants.22 In all cases, claimant must
establish the occurrence of negligently caused 23 physical contact with an un-
insured vehicle or hit and run vehicle as a condition precedent to his claim
against MVAIC.24 One class, "Insured ' '25 claimants, either own a vehicle lia-
bility policy or are covered by another's "omnibus clause." 20 Their rights flow
from the MVAIC endorsement, drafted by the corporation and approved by
the Superintendent of Insurance, which is attached to every vehicle liability
policy issued within the state.27 "Insured" claimants, if unable to settle with the
corporation, have recourse only to an arbitration proceeding 28 where they must
prove liability and damages. 29 A second class of claimants are termed "quali-
fied." °30 These are persons who do not have automobile liability insurance of
Motor Vehicle Acc. Indemnification Corp., 28 Misc. 2d 1002, 213 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sup. Ct.
1961) (No MVAIC coverage existed where insurer did not deny coverage but later became
defunct and unable to satisfy claim covered by the policy).
19. N.Y. Ins. Law § 600(2).
20. See N.Y. Legis. Annual 1958, pp. 244, 299, 436, 473; N.Y. Ins. Law § 600
(Declaration of legislative purpose); McCarthy v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indemnification Corp.,
16 A.D.2d 35, 38, 224 N.Y.S.2d 909, 916 (4th Dep't 1962), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 922, 188 N.E.2d
405, 238 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1963); Ward, supra note 4, at 239.
21. Hellem v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indemnification Corp., 18 Misc. 2d 901, 166 N.E.2d
192, 194 N.Y.S.2d 59 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (without discussion held the Motor Vehicle Accident
Indemnity Corporation Law (N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 759) to be constitutional).
22. N.Y. Ins. Law §§ 167(2-a), 601(1).
23. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indemnification Corp. v. Brinson, 18 A.D.2d 809, 236 N.Y.S.2d
567 (2d Dep't 1963); McCarthy v. Motor Vehicle Ace. Indemnification Corp., 16 A.D.2d
35, 224 N.Y.S.2d 909 (4th Dep't 1962), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 922, 188 N.E.2d 405, 238 N.Y.S.2d
101 (1963) (In no case is MVAIC responsible for intentional vehicular assaults).
24. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indemnification Corp. v. Lupo, 18 A.D.2d 717, 236 N.Y.S.2d 464
(2d Dep't 1962), inotion Jor leave to appeal denied, 13 N.Y.2d 756, 192 N.E.2d 28, 242
N.Y.S.2d 60 (1963); Motor Vehicle Acc. Indemnification Corp. v. Harrington, 39 Misc. 2d
79, 239 N.Y.S.2d 934 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Bellavia v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indemnification Corp.,
28 Misc. 2d 420, 211 N.Y.S.2d 356 (Sup. Ct. 1961) (Petitioner denied recovery from MVAIC
when struck by a parked car shoved onto the sidewalk by a hit and run vehicle; no actual
contact with uninsured vehicle).
25. N.Y. Ins. Law § 601(i).
26. White v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indemnification Corp., 39 Misc. 2d 678, 241 N.Y.S.2d
566 (Supp. Ct. 1963); Marbly v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indemnification Corp., 40 Misc. 2d
973, 244 N.Y.S.2d 92 (Sup. Ct. 1963). See Nyman v. Montelone-berville Garage, Inc., 211
La. 375, 380, 30 So.2d 123, 125 (1947). "Omnibus clause" of an automobile liability policy
is for the purpose of giving additional insureds other than persons named in the policy the
benefit of coverage under the policy.
27. N.Y. Ins. Law § 167(2-a).
28. Rosenbaum v. American Sur. Co., 11 N.Y.2d 310, 183 N.E.2d 667, 229 N.Y.S.2d
375 (1962).
29. N.Y. Ins. Law § 617; Rosenbaum v. American Sur. Co., 11 N.Y.2d 310, 183 N.E.2d
667, 229 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1962) (Petitioner by agreement to the terms of the endorsement
limits the terms of arbitration to those prescribed in the endorsement (i.e., damage and
fault)); 15 Buffalo L. Rev. 228 (1965).
30. N.Y. Ins. Law § 601(b).
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any kind and whose claim against MVAIC will never reach an arbitrator but
must be decided in court.31 The "qualified" claimant's rights flow from the
statute3 2 rather than the uninsured motorist endorsement. A pedestrian who is
not "insured" and is struck by a hit and run driver is entitled to recovery as
a "qualified" claimant. 33 Awards made to "qualified" claimants do not call for
the reduction of the award by workmen's compensation 34 whereas MVAIC
awards to "insured" claimants are so reduced pursuant to the Insurance Com-
missioner's regulations. 35 When faced with such ostensible discrimination the
courts have held that legislatures need not achieve "abstract symmetry" in
their treatment of two distinct classes of claimants to assure both equal pro-
tection under the law.3 6 It is only necessary that such classifications be reason-
able and based upon some real and substantial distinction.3 7 Here the distinction
seems clear. The purpose of the uninsured motorist endorsement is to protect
compulsory vehicle insurance owners, their families and guests via a self in-
surance contract for which legal consideration has been paid. The purpose of
the statutory scheme, however, is to protect non-car owning families s who have
no contract for such self insurance but are gratuitous donees of our automobile
society. Where a compulsory uninsured motorist endorsement exists, legislatures
have not set out just what the endorsement should contain but have left the
Insurance Commissioner with broad legislative guidelines.3 9 Such a practice
appears to be common procedure for drafting insurance policy endorsements.
40
This custom, coupled with amendments to the original California41 and South
Carolina42 statutes calling for the deduction of workmen's compensation, seems
to indicate the acceptance of such a deduction in this form of endorsement. It
should be pointed out that the Workmen's Compensation Law does not prohibit
31. Moore v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indemnification Corp., 18 A.D.2d 1006, 238 N.Y.S.2d
616 (2d Dep't 1963).
32. N.Y. Ins. Law §§ 600-26.
33. N.Y. Ins. Law § 601(b); also see McNair v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indemnification
Corp., 13 A.D.2d 339, 216 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1st Dep't 1961), aff'd, 11 N.Y.2d 701, 180 N.E.2d
919, 225 N.Y.S.2d 767 (1962) (Where the pedestrian is the owner of an uninsured vehicle he
may be a "qualified" claimant).
34. N.Y. Ins. Law §§ 601(b), 610.
35. See note 2 supra.
36. See Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 144 (1914); People v. Friedman, 302
N.Y. 75, 80, 96 N.E.2d 184, 186 (1950).
37. See Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 317 (1921); Four Maple Drive Realty Corp.
v. Abrams, 2 A.D.2d 753, 755, 153 N.Y.S.2d 747, 751 (2d Dep't 1956).
38. McKinney's N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, p. 1530; N.Y. Ins. Law §§ 167(2-a), 608.
39. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.0857 (1960); IM. Ann. Stat. ch. 73, § 755(a) (Smith-
Hurd 1965); La. Rev. Stat. § 22:1406D (Supp. 1964); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 736.317
(1964); S.C. Code Ann. § 46-750.11 (1962).
40. See, e.g., Red Hook Cold Storage Co. v. Department of Labor, 295 N.Y. 1, 64
N.E.2d 265 (1945); Marburg v. Cole, 286 N.Y. 202, 212, 36 N.E.2d 113, 117 (1941);
Darweger v. Staats, 267 N.Y. 290, 306, 196 N.E. 61, 66 (1935).
41. See 1959 Cal. Stats., ch. 817, § 1, p. 2835 (no language permitting the deduction of
workmen's compensation) ; 35 Ops. A.G. Cal. 71, 75-76 (1960) (1959 statute could properly
call for workmen's compensation deduction); 1961 Cal. Stats., ch. 1189, § 2, p. 2921 [expressly
providing for the deduction of workmen's compensation (cf., Cal. Ins. Code § 1158.2(2g))].
42. See S.C. Code Ann. § 46-750.33(9) (1963) (express provision for the deduction of
workmen's compensation where a similar 1959 statute made no mention of the deduction).
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the MVAIC endorsement from calling for the deduction of workmen's com-
pensation payments. Nor does the fact that the compensation carrier is entitled
to a lien, to the extent of previous compensation payments on proceeds
accruing to the claimant from a third party tortfeasor4 3 affect "insured" peti-
tioner's recovery from MVAIC. Since the Workmen's Compensation Law44 speaks
of a lien against a third party tortfeasor4 5 MVAIC is not subject to such a lien.
The relation between an "insured" claimant and MVAIC is not one of victim
and tortfeasor but one of insured and insurer.4 6 The claim of "insured" is one
based on an insurance contract and not a tort.47 This accounts for the fact that
a six year statute of limitations, applicable to contract actions, and not a three
year statute of limitations, as found in tort actions, has been applied in certain
cases involving the MVAIC endorsement. 48 The fact that the workmen's com-
pensation carrier is not reimbursed for its original outlay from the benefits of
claimant's self insurance is neither in violation of the New York Workmen's
Compensation Law' 9 or the case law.50 The problem remains that where peti-
tioner is an "insured," his recovery is limited to 10,000 dollars less the work-
men's compensation award he previously received. However, where the claimant
is deemed "qualified" his recovery seems to be expanded. The "qualified"
claimant is entitled to the compensation award and the MVAIC award without
the reduction."' Thus it would appear that the "qualified" claimant is entitled
to greater compensation than one who has contracted for the same protection.
The equalizing factor may lie in the proposition that the immunity of the
"insured" claimant's MVAIC award from a third party workmen's compensation
43. N.Y. Workmen's Comp. Law § 29(1).
44. N.Y. Workmen's Comp. Law § 29(1),(2).
45. N.Y. Workmen's Comp. Law § 29(1), "If an employee . . . be injured . . . by
another not in the same employ, such injured employee . . . need not elect whether to take
compensation ... or to pursue his remedy against such other but may take such compensa-
tion . . . and . . . pursue his remedy against such other subject to . . . this Chapter....
[I]n such case, the state insurance fund, . . . or insurance carrier liable for the payment of
such compensation . . . shall have a lien on the proceeds of any recovery from such
other .... " (Emphasis added).
46. See Commissioner of State Ins. Fund v. Miller, 4 A.D.2d 481, 482, 166 N.Y.S.2d
777, 779 (1st Dep't 1957); Meil v. Syracuse Constr. Inc., 42 Misc. 2d 39, 45, 247 N.Y.S.2d
541, 545 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
47. Commissioner of State Ins. Fund v. Miller, 4 A.D.2d 481, 482, 166 N.Y.S.2d 777,
779 (1st Dep't 1957): "Defendant's insurer cannot, however, be deemed the alter ego of the
tort-feasor. It does not insure the tort-feasor against liability; it insures its policyholder
against the risk of inadequate compensation for his compensable injuries. Its liability to
defendant is contractual, although premised in part upon the contingency of a third party's
tort liability."
48. McGuinness v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indemnification Corp., 40 Misc. 2d 775, 243
N.Y.S.2d 764 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
49. See, N.Y. Workmen's Comp. Law §§ 29(1),(2) (workmen's compensation reim-
bursed from tortfeasor only); N.Y. Workmen's Comp. Law § 30.
50. Commissioner of State Ins. Fund v. Miller, 4 A.D.2d 481, 166 N.Y.S.2d 777 (1st
Dep't 1957); Pilger v. County of Westchester, 284 App. Div. 242, 131 N.Y.S.2d 795 (3d
Dep't 1954), appeal denied, 284 App. Div. 855, 134 N.Y.S.2d 175 (3d Dep't 1954), aff'd,
308 N.Y. 1014, 127 N.E.2d 858 (1955).
51. N.Y. Ins. Law §§ 601(b), 610.
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lien flows from a contractual relationship between the "insured" and MVAIC.52
In the case of a qualified claimant, the contractual relationship of insured and
insurer is non-existent and therefore the MVAIC award receives no immunity
from a lien effectuated by the compensation carrier. Thus the "qualified" claim-
ant's award from MVAIC would be reduced by the compensation lien53 and
claimant would not reap the harvest of a double recovery."
In the instant case the Court found petitioner was an "insured" claimant
under his employer's motor vehicle liability policy which contained a MVAIC
endorsement pursuant to New York Insurance Law section 167(2-a). The
Court further found this section gives the MVAIC board of directors authority
to prescribe conditions of coverage under the uninsured motorist endorsement,
i.e., reduction of the award by previous compensation payments, where such
conditions are approved by the Superintendent of Insurance and not contrary
to legislative intent. The ramifications of these findings are that the portion of
the endorsement calling for the reduction of the MVAIC award by any com-
pensation award received by "insured" was a valid exercise of administrative
power and not contrary to legislative intent or purpose. The "insured" claimant
has contracted for, be it voluntary or involuntary, protection involving both
arbitration and a workmen's compensation deduction. The fact that the statu-
tory method of recompensing the "qualified" claimant contains neither should
in no way invalidate the "insured" claimant's contract. The Court seems to say
that the "insured" claimant in accepting and entering into the insurance contract
became subject to the rights (reimbursement for certain injuries) and conditions
(arbitration and the deduction of workmen's compensation from the final
award) of that contract. "Insured" thus has no justification in pow denying the
terms of the contract to which he subscribed or to which another subscribed
for his protection. Nor can "insured" equate himself with the "qualified"
claimant who neither contracts for protection nor finds protection within the
boundaries of another's insurance contract. The distinction between the two
classes is clear and neither the legislature nor MVAIC is obligated to treat
both classes of claimants on a par. The Court concluded that the "insured"
was entitled to the 10,000 dollars found by the arbitrator less the previous
workmen's compensation award he had received. 55
The purpose of MVAIC law is to afford innocent victims of uninsured or
hit and run vehicles the same protection as if the wrongdoer were covered by
52. Commissioner of State Ins. Fund v. Miller, 4 A.D.2d 481, 482, 166 N.Y.S.2d 777, 779
(1st Dep't 1957).
53. N.Y. Workmen's Comp. Law § 29(1).
54. Note, if the courts refused to levy the third party compensation lien on the
"qualified" claimant's MVAIC award the "qualified" claimant's "in pocket" cash award would
be greatly increased (i.e., see chart II where award would almost double) thus manifesting a
serious inequality.
55. Instant case at 411, 207 N.E.2d at 600, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 2 (Claimant was also awarded
interest from the date of the award under sections 480 and 1464 of the New York CPA
(present N.Y. CPLR §§ 5002 and 8101 respectively)); also see Matter of East India Trading
Co., 280 App. Div. 420, 114 N.Y.S.2d 93 (1st Dep't 1952), aff'd, 305 N.Y. 866, 114 N.E.2d
213 (1953).
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a compulsory 10,000 dollar vehicle liability policy.56 If this is so, it would seem
that the Court should have looked directly to the statutory purpose in deter-
mining whether the rider attached to New York State vehicle liability policies
achieved such a purpose. To ascertain whether the legislative purpose is in
reality achieved two charts are presented within the text. The first, chart I,
demonstrates the cash flow of monies accruing to three distinct classes of victims
and the compensation carrier 57 through suit or settlement involving MVAIC in
two instances and an insured tortfeasor in the third. It should be noted in
chart I that the contingent fee for an attorney's services is not reflected. The
second chart, chart II, demonstrates the same cash flow as chart 1 except that
in chart II an attorney's services are procured by the victim under a one-third
contingency fee contract. The facts surrounding the accidents giving rise to the
MVAIC award or court judgment reflected in charts I and II are as follows:
Column 1 represents the facts in the instant case. Column 2 represents a "quali-
fied" claimant injured while a pedestrian on his job and through the negligence
of an uninsured driver. Column 3 represents the normal plaintiff injured on
the job and suing the insured tortfeasor.
In chart I the injured parties, final cash recovery is not affected by whether
the compensation award is applied as a limitation of recovery58 as in the case of
"insured" or is returned to the compensation carrier via a third party com-
pensation lien.5 9 In either case the "insured" claimant, the "qualified" claimant
and the normal plaintiff receive the same "in pocket" cash award. 0 Therefore
where restitution is made to each party without an attorney the purpose of
MVAIC law is satisfied.6 1 However in Chart II the equalities in form seen in
chart I become. inequalities in substance where an attorney's services become
necessary.
In chart II the fact that the compensation award is immediately deducted
56. N.Y. Legis. Annual, 1958 pp. 244, 299, 436, 473; N.Y. Ins. Law § 600 (legislative
declaration of purpose); McCarthy v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indemnification Corp., 16 A.D.2d
35, 38, 224 N.Y.S.2d 909, 916 (4th Dep't 1962), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 922, 188 N.E.2d 405, 238
N.Y.S.2d 101 (1963); Ward, New York's Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corpora-
tion: Past, Present and Future, 8 Buffalo L. Rev. 215, 239 (1958).
57. N.Y. Workmen's Comp. Law § 29(1),(2); Moeller v. Associated Hosp. Serv. of
Capital Dist., 304 N.Y. 73, 106 N.E.2d 16 (1952). See charts I and II, row F.
58. Note: the compensation award is deducted in computing "insured" claimant's total
cash award from MVAIC. The actual MVAIC award equals "insured" claimant's physical
injuries, not in excess of $10,000, less previous compensation payments accruing to "insured"
from the same accident. The deduction of the compensation award by MVAIC is merely
a paper computation and MVAIC does not reimburse workmen's compensation to the
extent of such deduction.
59. N.Y. Workmen's Comp. Law § 29(1),(2); Moeller v. Associated Hosp. Serv. of
Capital Dist., 304 N.Y. 73, 106 N.E.2d 16 (1952). See charts I and II, row F.
60. See footnotes 50-54 supra, and text therein.
61. See N.Y. Legis. Annual 1958, pp. 244, 299, 436, 473; N.Y. Ins. Law § 600 (legisla-
tive declaration of purpose); McCarthy v. Motor Vehicle Ace. Indemnification Corp., 16
A.D.2d 35, 38, 224 N.Y.S.2d 909, 916 (4th Dep't 1962), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 922, 188 N.E.2d
405, 238 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1963) ; Ward, supra note 56 (i.e., purpose to treat claimants the same
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from the "insured" claimant's MVAIC award62 before claimant's attorney can
effectuate a lien63 on his one-third interest gives "insured" a financial edge over
the "qualified" claimant and normal plaintiff where similar awards or judgments
are received by each. In the case of the "qualified" claimant and normal plain-
tiff the interest of the compensation carrier is subordinate to6 4 the lien of the
attorney.65 That is, the attorney would receive approximately 3,333 dollars
plus expenses following a 10,000 dollar award before the compensation carrier
could levy his lien on the proceeds. 60 In the case of the "insured" claimant, the
attorney would have a one-third contractual interest in the net MVAIC award,
10,000 dollars less the previous compensation award, or 1,100 dollars. Con-
sequently at least two and possibly three inequalities which are subtle in form
(i.e., chart I) become real in substance (i.e., chart II). A basic inequality exists
in that workmen's compensation is never reimbursed for its previous award to
an "insured" claimant. The second inequality is that the fee received by the
attorney for the "qualified" claimant and the normal plaintiff is greater than
that received by the "insured" claimant's attorney. The third inequality is that
the "insured" claimant's final "in pocket" cash award exceeds that of the
"qualified" claimant and normal plaintiff. The first inequality, common to both
charts I and II, arises from the failure of the compensation carrier to be re-
imbursed for its previous award to an "insured" claimant. Since MVAIC does
not return to the compensation carrier the amount of the workmen's com-
pensation benefits it deducted from the "insured" claimant's MVAIC award,
and the "insured" is protected by a contractual immunity from a third party
compensation lien,67 the compensation carrier is left without a means of re-
covery. This first inequality may be justified since "insured's" recovery is from
his own insurance carrier and the result of his own payments. The "qualified"
claimant or normal plaintiff, on the other hand, are not recovering from an
insurance carrier with which they themselves, or someone else for their benefit,
contracted for their protection. Rather they are recovering from either the
insured tortfeasor or MVAIC, who chooses to stand in the shoes of a tort-
feasor. The second inequality is the difference in fees flowing to the "insured"
claimant's attorney6 s and that received by the attorney representing the "quali-
fied" claimant and normal plaintiff.60 This might induce the attorney to choose
either a "qualified" claimant or normal plaintiff over an "insured" claimant in
62. See chart II row B.
63. See chart II row D.
64. See chart II row F.
65. Jackson v. City of New York, 182 Misc. 686, 45 N.Y.S.2d 505 (Sup. Ct. 1943). See
chart II row D.
66. Sarancza v. Roberts & Grancelli Inc., 41 Misc. 2d 45, 245 N.Y.S.2d 403 (Sup. Ct.
1963); Matter of Applebaum, 180 Misc. 881, 41 N.Y.S.2d 227 (Surr. Ct. 1943); chart II
row F.
67. See text following footnote 45 up to and including footnote 48 for discussion on the
contractual immunity of "insured" claimant's MVAIC award from a third party compensa-
"tion lien.
68. See chart II, col. 1, row D.
69. See chart II, cols. 2 and 3, row D.
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order to increase his own monetary return. In practice however this seems doubt-
ful. This inequality is offset by the fact that "insured" claimant's attorney
need only face an arbitration proceeding7" whereas the attorney for the "quali-
fied" claimant or normal plaintiff may face an expensive and lengthy courtroom
trial. The third inequality is that "insured" claimant's actual "in pocket" cash
recovery 71 exceeds the "in pocket" cash recovery of both the "qualified" claim-
ant and the normal plaintiff.72 This results from the fact that the previous
workmen's compensation benefit is deducted from the "insured" claimant's
MVAIC award thus reducing the actual cash award upon which the attorney
can levy his one-third contingency fee. In the case of the "qualified" claimant
and the normal plaintiff the compensation lien73 is subordinate to the lien of
the client's attorney.74 The inequality is justified by the fact that "insured"
has given legal consideration, via additional premiums, for self insurance, be it
voluntary or involuntary, against injury from an uninsured or hit and run
vehicle. That is to say the "insured" claimant has paid his own way and is
entitled to the slight excess he receives over the "qualified" claimant or nornial
plaintiff. The "qualified" claimant has paid nothing for this additional coverage
and is no more than a gratuitous donee of an affluent automobile society. The
normal plaintiff, on the other hand, is not recovering from MVAIC but rather
from an insured tortfeasor. He sets the standard which the statute strives to
achieve. 76 As to this normal plaintiff the inequalities are often outweighed by
his chance to recover property damages76 and a possible chance for reimburse-
ment in excess of 10,000 dollars from the tortfeasor himself. Again the "insured"
claimant seems entitled to his financial edge since he himself and not the tort-
feasor has funded the insurance carrier from which his recovery flows. The
possibility of any harm accruing from this last inequality seems slight. The
probability of a knowledgeable victim of an automobile accident failing to
pursue a known insured tortfeasor where workmen's compensation is involved
and instead fraudulently claiming to have been injured by a hit and run vehicle
to increase his own award is almost too remote to conceive. Since the above
inequalities arise only when workmen's compensation is present and since the
inequalities are jutifiable and will be reduced in direct relation to a reduction
in the amount of the compensation award, 77 a conclusion that the legislative
70. Matter of Rosenbaum (American Sur. Co., N.Y.), 11 N.Y.2d 310, 183 NE.2d 667,
229 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1962).
71. See chart I, col. 1, row G.
72. See chart II, cols. 2 and 3, row G.
73. See chart II, row F.
74. See chart I, row D; Jackson v. City of New York, 182 Misc. 686, 45 N.Y.S.2d
505 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
75. See N.Y. Legis. Annual 1958, pp. 244, 299, 436, 473; N.Y. Ins. Law § 600; Mc-
Carthy v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indemnification Corp., 16 A.D.2d 35, 38, 224 N.Y.S.2d 909, 916(4th Dep't 1962), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 922, 188 N.E.2d 405, 238 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1963); Ward,
supra at note 56.
76. N.Y. Ins. Law §§ 600, 167(2-a) do not allow recovery for property damage.
77. Note: where the workmen's compensation award is reduced from $4,000 to $2,000
(assuming equal awards and judgments of $10,000 for "insured," "qualified," and normal
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purpose appears fulfilled by the endorsement requiring the deduction of the
workmen's compensation benefits from "insured's" MVAIC award seems sound.
If the validity of this clause of the New York uninsured drivers endorsement
should be challenged again in the future it would seem that the court might do
well to justify its decision on the purpose of the MVAIC law7 8 rather than the
fact that the Commissioner of Insurance has the authority to call for such a
clause and that therefore the clause is not contrary to legislative intent. That is
to say reflection on the end result of such a clause as well as on the means of
reaching such an end might cast a greater light on the numerous shadows
presently surrounding MVAIC law.
Although the Court could not hold otherwise79 in the instant case, in the
light of present statutory and case law in this field a legislative amendment to
the current New York Workmen's Compensation Law8" might give the courts
the impetus to break the shield of contractual immunity surrounding the "in-
sured" claimant's recovery and thus completely eliminate any inequalities which
tend to reduce the effectiveness of the statute81 in achieving the legislative pur-
pose of MVAIC law.82 An amendment to the New York Workmen's Compensa-
tion Law section 29(1) expressly granting to compensation carriers the author-
ity to exercise a lien on the proceeds of any judgment or award accruing from
MVAIC to the extent of a prior compensation award arising from the same
accident would serve such a purpose. Since the presence of such a lien would
negate the possibility of "insured" reaping the benefit of a double recovery
(i.e., once from the compensation carrier and once from MVAIC) the amend-
ment would dissolve the reasoning behind and the need for the clause in the
present MVAIC endorsement calling for the paper deduction of any prior
compensation award to "insured" in determining the "insured" claimant's
maximum MVAIC award. Such an amendment coupled with a fixed schedule
plaintiff) the difference between the final "in pocket" cash recovery of "insured" and that of
the "qualified" claimant or normal plaintiff is cut in half. The difference in the amounts
received by the different attorneys is likewise reduced.
78. N.Y. Legis. Annual 1958, pp. 244, 299, 436, 473; N.Y. Ins. Law § 600; McCarthy
v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indemnification Corp., 16 A.D.2d 35, 38, 224 N.Y.S.2d 909, 916 (4th
Dep't 1962), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 922, 188 N.E.2d 405, 238 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1963); Ward, slepra
note 56.
79. Note, to hold otherwise, i.e., that the clause calling for the deduction of workmen's
compensation is contrary to legislative intent, would not serve to bring the endorsement in
line with the legislative intent by eliminating any slight inequality existing in the case
of "insured"; but tend to increase the difference now existing between the "insured's" award
and that of the "qualified" claimant and normal plaintiff. Rather the "insured" would recover
both the MVAIC award and the compensation award and thus reap the double harvest.
Even if the court could find that "insured" claimant's contract, being involuntary in nature,
did not create a contractual immunity from a third party compensation lien they would
still have to set aside the specific statutory language of § 29(1) of New York's Workmen's
Compensation Law in order to allow workmen's compensation to effectuate its lien on
"insured's" award to prevent any great inequity from arising.
80. N.Y. Workmen's Comp. Law § 29(1).
81. N.Y. Ins. Law § 167(2-a).
82. N.Y. Legis. Annual 1958, pp. 244, 299, 436, 473; N.Y. Ins. Law § 600; McCarthy
v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indemnification Corp., 16 A.D.2d 35, 38 224 N.Y.S.2d 909, 916 (4th
Dept' 1962), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 188 N.E.2d 405, 238 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1963) ; Ward, supra note 56.
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of attorney fees, where as in the case of "insured" arbitration rather than trial
is the mode of recovery, would tend to bring the MVAIC law directly in line
with the legislative intent that motivated its creation. A fixed fee schedule would
return less than the customary 33 1/3 per cent to the attorney whose services
were required for arbitration but could be computed in such a way as to fairly
compensate him for the time involved in such a proceeding. That such an
amendment would eliminate the inequalities now present in the MVAIC law
and the need for complex reasoning to offset them is without question. The
only factor mitigating against such an amendment is the increased cost to
MVAIC which would result if MVAIC were required to reimburse the com-
pensation carrier for its prior award to claimant. Such an increase in cost, al-
though eventually passed on to the liability insurance policy holder, in the form
of increased premiums, would seem a small price to pay considering the limited
claims against MVAIC involving workmen's compensation, when balanced
against the reduction in the cost of funding workmen's compensation and the
improvements in the operational ease of MVAIC law.
FREDERICK A. WOLF
LABOR LAW-WHEm DISPUTING GENERAL CONTRACTOR AT COMMON
SITUS IN CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY RESERVES GATE FOR ExcLusIvE USE OF
His EMPLOYEES, UNION MAY PICKET THAT GATE ONLY.
Markwell & Hartz, Inc. (hereinafter designated as M & H) was the general
contractor on a project being conducted for and on the premises of the East
Jefferson Water Works, of Jefferson Parish, Louisiana. As general contractor
M & H subcontracted the work which it decided not to perform itself. Conse-
quently, all electrical work was awarded to subcontractor Barnes, while all the
pile-driving operations were awarded to subcontractor Binnings. M & H was
involved in a labor dispute with the Building and Construction Trades Council
of New Orleans, AFL-CIO (hereinafter designated Respondent). Both subcon-
tractors employed members of craft unions affiliated with Respondent. The
premises of the Water Works were completely surrounded by a chain-link fence,
so that all ingoing and outgoing traffic had to pass through the four gates
provided. Two of the gates (hereinafter designated as A and B), were located
on the northern boundary of the Works and the remaining two (hereinafter
designated as C and D), were located on the eastern boundary of the premises.
Respondent union commenced picketing all four gates during normal working
hours, bearing signs informing the public and those persons who used the
747
